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Abstract
We investigate, in the Shannon model, the security of constructions corresponding to double
and (two-key) triple DES. That is, we consider Fk1 (Fk2(·)) and Fk1(F
−1
k2
(Fk1 (·))) with the
component functions being ideal ciphers. This models the resistance of these constructions to
“generic” attacks like meet in the middle attacks.
We obtain the first proof that composition actually increases the security in some meaningful
sense. We compute a bound on the probability of breaking the double cipher as a function of the
number of computations of the base cipher made, and the number of examples of the composed
cipher seen, and show that the success probability is the square of that for a single key cipher.
The same bound holds for the two-key triple cipher. The first bound is tight and shows that
meet in the middle is the best possible generic attack against the double cipher.
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1 Introduction
A block cipher is a map F : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. Here κ is the key size and n is the block
size. Each κ-bit key k induces a map Fk(·)
def
= F (k, ·) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n which is a permutation on
{0, 1}n. Let F−1 denote the inverse cipher, meaning F−1(k, ·)
def
= F−1k is the inverse map of Fk(·).
For example, DES is such a cipher with κ = 56 and n = 64.
It is common practice to compose ciphers in attempts to increase security. The result of com-
position is a new cipher, with a larger key size but the same block size. Here are the two most
popular mechanisms, corresponding, respectively, to double DES and (two-key) triple DES:
• Double F , or the 2-cascade cipher: Dbl-F : {0, 1}2κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined by
Dbl-F k1,k2(x) = Fk1(Fk2(x)) .
• Two-key triple F : Trp2-F : {0, 1}2κ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined by
Trp2-F k1,k2(x) = Fk1(F
−1
k2
(Fk1(x))) .
Let Op-F : {0, 1}κ
∗
× {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n denote one of these, where κ∗ = 2κ and Op ∈ {Dbl,Trp2}.
What we want to know is: How good a cipher is Op-F? Has the composition and the increased
key length actually bought us anything?
Generic versus cryptanalytic attacks. There are several possible approaches to this ques-
tion, depending on what kinds of attacks one wants to take into account. There are two main
classes of attacks:
• Cryptanalytic attacks: Like differential [3, 4] and linear [9] cryptanalysis
• Generic attacks: Like exhaustive key search and meet-in-the-middle attacks.
Generic attacks are, roughly, those that don’t exploit the structure of the cipher, but work against
any cipher, even an ideal one. More precisely, we define generic attacks as those that succeed in
the Shannon model of an ideal cipher discussed below.
The strength of specific composed ciphers like double DES against cryptanalytic attacks is not
known; certainly, one does not expect a proof of such strength. The strength of the composed
cipher against generic attacks, in contrast, can at least in principle be determined, by an analysis
in the Shannon model, since it is a purely information theoretic question. However, the technical
problems here are quite challenging; in particular, it is not even known that composition increases
the strength of a cipher at all in this model.
In this paper we tackle this question, analyzing, in the Shannon model, two-key based com-
positions such as the above. We will prove upper bounds on the probability of “breaking” the
composed cipher as a function of the “effort” invested by the adversary, with both terms in quotes
to be properly defined. Our results are the first to show that cipher composition in the Shannon
model actually increases security: the success probability of an adversary, as a function of her
resources, is significantly lower than in the case of a single key cipher. For the double cipher our
results are actually tight (optimal) and show that meet in the middle is the best possible generic
attack on this cipher. We now define the model, and state our results, more precisely.
1.1 The model
We model F as an ideal block cipher in the sense of Shannon. This means F (k, ·) is a random
permutation on {0, 1}n, for each k. More precisely, let PERM(n) be the set of all permutations on
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{0, 1}n. Then, for each κ-bit key k, select, uniformly and independently, a map from PERM(n),
and assign Fk this value. So F consists of 2
κ maps, each a random permutation.
Now, we want to ask how good is Op as a composition operator. How can we measure this? We
do so in a strong adversarial model, which allows the adversary chosen plaintext attacks on Op-F .
Furthermore, success for the adversary A does not mean she has to find the key: it suffices that A
identify some “weakness” in the cipher. This means A should be able to detect any deviation in
Op-F k∗(·) from a truly random permutation, when k
∗ is a random and hidden key for Op-F .
Formally, give the adversary oracles for F,F−1. (This models her ability to compute the original
cipher at any points she likes.) Also give her an oracle we call E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, which can
take one of two forms:
• World 1: Set E = Op-F k∗(·) where k
∗ ∈ {0, 1}κ
∗
is a randomly chosen key for cipher Op-F
• World 2: Set E = π where π is a permutation chosen randomly from PERM(n).
Put the adversary A in one of these worlds, and ask her which one she is in. If she can’t tell
then Op-F k∗(·) is behaving like a random permutation, meaning it is good. Formally, define the
advantage of A as P1 − P2, where Pi is the probability that A outputs 1 in world i ∈ {1, 2}. (The
probability is over the choice of the oracles in each case.) Call A a (q, t)-adversary if it makes at
most t queries to the F,F−1 oracles and at most q queries to the E oracle. (Note in practice t is
likely to be much larger than q since F,F−1 queries are just DES computations and E queries are
plaintexts in a chosen plaintext attack. We always assume q ≥ 1 since otherwise the advantage of
the adversary is zero no matter what the construction.) Define
Sec(Op, κ, n, q, t)
as the maximum advantage attainable by any (q, t)-adversary. This is the key quantity; it is a
function we call the security of the operator Op. The question is to determine this function as
accurately as possible. In particular we want to upper bound it as a function of the adversary
resources q, t and the block cipher parameters κ, n.
Before stating the results we stress the power of the model. It allows chosen plaintext attacks
on the composite cipher Op-F . Note it certainly captures common attacks like birthday attacks
and meet-in-the-middle attacks, but also more sophisticated attacks which could be adaptive.
Notice that the advantage of a (q, t) adversary in attacking the single key cipher F itself in this
model (namely E = Fk for a random κ bit string k in world 1) will be (at most) t/2
κ. This is the
mark we have to beat if we want to show that the composed cipher is stronger than the original
one.
1.2 The results
It is known that the strength of the composed cipher is at least that of the first [10], but prior to
this work it was not known whether the advantage of a (q, t) adversary versus Dbl-F was any lower
than its advantage versus the single key cipher F itself. Here we are able to show that composition
actually increases security, in the ideal cipher model described above.
The double key cipher. Recall that the double F cipher Dbl-F has 2κ bits of key. Our main
result is Theorem 3.1, which says that Sec(Op, κ, n, q, t) is at most t2/22κ. Namely, no (q, t)-
adversary attacking the double cipher can achieve an advantage greater than t2/22κ.
We also show this bound is essentially tight, due to (a variant of) the meet in the middle attack.
Theorem A.2 presents an adversary who runs this attack, and analyzes it to show that its advantage
is within a small factor of t2/22κ.
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Figure 1: Sec1(x) (the upper curve) and Sec2(x) (the lower curve) are, respectively, the maximal possible
advantage obtainable by an adversary in breaking the single and double key ideal ciphers, respectively, as
a function of x = log
2
(t), the logarithm of the number of cipher computations made. We are using a key
length of κ = 56. We see that Sec2 lies below Sec1 but they meet at 1. The text provides the exact formulas
for these quantities.
Note that the maximum possible advantage of an adversary attacking the double cipher case is
the square of the maximum possible advantage of an adversary of the same resources attacking the
original single key cipher. Thus, it is considerably smaller in most cases. (For example if κ = 56
and t = 245 then the former is 2−22 and the latter is 2−11. Or, looking at it another way, to achieve
an advantage of 2−11 against the double cipher you need at least 250 queries, while to get the same
advantage against the single cipher you need only 245 queries.) To see the relation better, we plot
in Figure 1 the maximal advantage t/2κ of an adversary in breaking the original single key cipher,
and the maximal advantage t2/22κ of an adversary in breaking the double cipher, as a function of
x = log2(t).
Notice that the upper bound on the advantage in the double key case hits one (meaning, the
scheme can be broken) when t = 2κ. This is expected: that’s the meet in the middle attack. Of
course, that’s the same point at which the advantage hits one for the original single key cipher. (In
this case due to an exhaustive key search attack.) Thus, the “effective key length” of the double
cipher is not more than that of the single one. That does not mean that security has not increased.
Security is not a number, but a function of the resources invested, and our analysis and Figure 1
show that for values of t below 2κ the chance of breaking the double cipher is smaller than that of
breaking the original one.
The two-key triple cipher. We show that the same bound holds for the two-key triple cipher,
meaning the advantage of a (q, t) adversary is bounded by t2/22κ. This shows that here too there
is an improvement in the security curve as a function of t. In this case our bound is tight for the
case t ≈ q but not tight in general.
The m-fold cascade. The m-fold composition of cipher F is the cipher with key k1, . . . , km
defined by Fk1,...,km = Fk1 ◦Fk2 ◦· · ·◦Fkm . The techniques above extend to show that the advantage
of an (q, t) adversary is at most tm/2mκ. This shows that the advantage grows more and more slowly
as m increases. However, for m ≥ 3 the result is not tight; we expect the 3-fold composed cipher
to have an even greater strength than this indicates. Thus, we won’t discuss this result any more
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in this paper.
The future. The analysis of the two key ciphers we present here is a start on a problem that
appears to be quite technically challenging. In the future we would like to see tight bounds on the
advantage for the m-fold composition for m ≥ 3 and also for the two-key triple cipher in the case
q << t, but the distance needed to get there seems quite large at this time.
1.3 Related work
The model used here is that of Kilian and Rogaway [8], who in turn built on Even and Mansour
[7], although the basic idea of course goes back to Shannon [13].
Kilian and Rogaway [8] analyze Rivest’s DESX cipher in this model and show it has a large ef-
fective key length. If generic (or, as they call them, key search) attacks are the only concern, DESX
is cheaper than Double or Triple DES, but DESX is just as vulnerable as DES to differential and
linear cryptanalysis. The (apparent) strength of Double and two-key triple DES against cryptanal-
ysis coupled with the proven strength against generic attacks seem to make a strong combination
that is absent for DESX.
The basic meet in the middle attacks are due to [5, 12]. Even and Goldreich provide some
time-space tradeoffs for meet-in-the-middle attacks [6], and Van Oorschot and Wiener [14] reduce
the space requirements.
Even and Goldreich [6] had shown that the cascade of m ciphers is at least as strong as its
strongest component. Maurer and Massey [10] argued that this result required restrictions in the
model, and also showed that the cascade is at least as strong as its first component. Our work is
the first to show that the cascade can be stronger than the original cipher.
Our analysis builds on techniques of [8] and [2]. Applications aside, we feel that we are looking
at a basic information theoretic question, namely the power of cascaded ciphers.
A preliminary version of our paper appeard as [1]. Material omitted there due to space restric-
tions is included here.
1.4 Discussion on Implications of our result
What implications do these results have for the security of real ciphers like DES? This is a question
that needs to be addressed with some care. After all, DES is not an ideal cipher.
We are not claiming to have “proven Double DES” secure; that obviously is not a realistic
possibility. Our results might be interpreted as saying that the existence of a generic attack against
DES that is substantially better than the meet in the middle attack would imply that there are
serious weaknesses in the random behavior of DES that so far has empirical support.
The class of generic attacks is broad enough to be interesting, including meet-in-the-middle
attacks and variants of it. But it does not include cryptanalytic attacks like differential or linear
cryptanalysis, which exploit the structure of the cipher. However, one should note that at the
moment the best attacks against Double and Triple DES are not the cryptanalytic ones, but the
generic meet-in-the-middle attacks. And our results can be interpreted as ruling out improvements
along those lines.
The adversary resources we consider here are the number of cipher computations t and the
number of available plaintext-ciphertext pairs of the attacked cipher available, q. These are the
most basic resources, and also the natural ones to consider in an information theoretic setting. One
might attempt to consider other resources like space (e.g. when it is small compared to the number
of queries), or make a distinction between parallelizable and sequential computations. Addressing
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these issues would change the nature of the problem to the point where it is difficult to see how it
might be treated by techniques similar to the ones we use.
1.5 Organization
The double cipher analysis is in Section 3. There we state and prove the upper bound. In
Appendix A we present the meet in the middle attack analysis that shows the upper bound is
tight. The analysis of the two-key triple cipher is in Appendix B.
2 Definitions
General. We use standard notation for expressing probabilistic experiments and algorithms.
Namely if S is a probability space then x ← S denotes the operation of drawing x at random
according to distribution S. If S is a set we use the same notation with the understanding that S
is imbued with the uniform distribution. If S is not a set or probability space (in particular if x is
a string or function) then x← S is simply an assignment statement.
Block ciphers. For an integer n ≥ 1 let PERM(n) denote the set of all maps π : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
that are permutations, meaning both one-to-one and onto. A function F : {0, 1}κ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
is a block cipher if for each key k ∈ {0, 1}κ, the function F (k, ·) : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a permutation
on {0, 1}n, meaning a member of PERM(n). Here, n is the block length of the cipher and κ is the
key length of the cipher. Think of F as a 2κ by 2n table, with entry (k, x) containing F (k, x). Each
row is a permutation of {0, 1}n. For convenience, define Fk : {0, 1}
n → {0, 1}n, for each k ∈ {0, 1}κ,
by Fk(x) = F (k, x). This is the permutation in the k-th row. Although the function F does not
have an inverse function, it does have a well defined inverse block cipher. When it is clear from
context that F is a block cipher then we will let F−1 : {0, 1}κ ×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n denote the block
cipher inverse of F , defined as follows: F−1(k, y) = F−1k (y). That is, F
−1(k, y) = x iff F (k, x) = y.
Let BC(κ, n) denote the set of all block ciphers with key length κ and block length n. This is
viewed as a probability space under the uniform distribution. Thus F ← BC(κ, n) means that F
is selected according to the following experiment:
for all k ∈ {0, 1}κ do F (k, ·) ← PERM(n).
Operators: Double and triple. We are interested in transformations, or operators, which
map one block cipher to another. In general such an operator is a map Op taking a block cipher
F ∈ BC(κ, n) and returning another block cipher, which we denote by Op-F , and which belongs to
BC(κ∗, n∗) for some values of κ∗, n∗ that depend on κ, n and Op. (In this paper it will always be
the case that n∗ = n.) We now define the two central operators for this paper.
The double composition operator Dbl : BC(κ, n)→ BC(2κ, n) is defined by Dbl-F k1k2 = Fk1◦Fk2 .
In other words, Dbl-F (k1k2, x) = F (k1, F (k2, x)) for every k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1}
κ and every x ∈ {0, 1}n.
The two key, triple composition operator Trp2 : BC(κ, n) → BC(2κ, n) is defined by Trp2-F k1k2 =
Fk1 ◦F
−1
k2
◦Fk1 . In other words, Trp
2-F (k1k2, x) = F (k1, F
−1(k2, F (k1, x))) for every k1, k2 ∈ {0, 1}
κ
and every x ∈ {0, 1}n. Note both these ciphers have key length twice that of the original cipher.
Security. We will be considering the security of these operators. The setting for security is the
following. Consider an adversary algorithm A which has access to three oracles, E,F, F−1, where
F ∈ BC(κ, n) and E : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n. It computes with them and eventually outputs a bit. This
computation is adaptive. This means that it makes queries to oracles as it pleases, choosing these
queries as a function of answers to previous queries. We represent A’s output when interacting with
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these oracles by AE,F,F
−1
. (Since we will not restrict the computational power of the adversary A,
it is without loss of generality deterministic, and hence this output is uniquely defined once A,F,E
are fixed.) If the oracles that A interacts with are chosen according to some distribution then A’s
output will be a random variable over {0, 1}. We let
SuccA(κ, n) = Pr
[
AE,F,F
−1
= 1 : F ← BC(κ, n) ; E ← PERM(n)
]
denote the success probability of A in the “ideal world” (called world 2 in the Introduction) where
E is a random permutation independent of the cipher F . On the other hand, if Op : BC(κ, n) →
BC(κ∗, n∗) is an operator then we let
SuccA(Op, κ, n) = Pr
[
AE,F,F
−1
= 1 : F ← BC(κ, n) ; k∗ ← {0, 1}κ
∗
; E ← Op-F k∗
]
.
In other words, having selected F , apply the operator to it to get a new cipher F ∗ = Op-F . Now,
choose at random a permutation E of this cipher, by choosing a key k∗ and setting E to F ∗k∗ . (This
was called world 1 in the Introduction.) Now let
AdvA(Op, κ, n) = SuccA(Op, κ, n) − SuccA(κ, n) .
This is the the advantage of A in breaking the Op induced cipher. To measure the quality of a
particular operator Op (eg. Dbl or Trp2) we want to upper bound the advantage in terms of the
resources used by the adversary, meaning the number of queries it makes to its oracles. We call a
query to the E oracle an E-query; a query to the F oracle an F query; a query to the F−1 oracle
an F−1 query. Typically the number of E-queries is denoted q, while the sum of the number of F
and F−1 queries is denoted t. The security of the operator Op is then given by
Sec(Op, κ, n, q, t) = max
A
AdvA(Op, κ, n) ,
where the maximum is taken over all adversaries A who make at most q E-queries and at most t
F/F−1 queries. Thus our goal will be to bound Sec(Op, κ, n, q, t) in terms of q, t, κ, n for the two
ciphers we are investigating, namely Op = Dbl and Op = Trp2.
We stress that this bound will apply to any adversary. No assumptions are made about the
strategy followed by this adversary other than that it is limited to the specified number of queries.
3 Security analysis of the double cipher
In this section our goal will be to determine the security of the doubly iterated ideal cipher. In
other words, we want to estimate, as accurately as possible, the value of Sec(Dbl, κ, n, q, t), as a
function of the cipher parameters κ, n and the adversary resource bounds q, t. The following is the
main theorem, which provides an upper bound on the security. It says that the advantage of any
adversary A attacking the doubly iterated ideal cipher is at most t2/22κ, regardless of the strategy
used by this adversary.
Theorem 3.1 For any κ, n, q, t ≥ 1 it is the case that
Sec(Dbl, κ, n, q, t) ≤
t2
22κ
.
Notice that the bound depends only on the number t of F/F−1 queries made by A, and the key
length κ of the cipher; it does not depend on the number q of E-queries made by A or the block
length n of the cipher. This reflects the reality. In fact our result is essentially tight; more precisely,
the bound above is tight up to constant factors as long as q is not too tiny. This is established by
Theorem A.2 where we show that an appropriate adaptation of the standard meet in the middle
attack enables an adversary to obtain an advantage close to that of the upper bound.
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The rest of this section will be devoted to a proof of Theorem 3.1. We fix an adversary A who
makes at most q E queries and at most t F/F−1 queries. We want to show that AdvA(Dbl, κ, n) ≤
t2/22κ. We will first introduce some terminology.
3.1 Preliminaries
The probability spaces. We consider two “games.” Each consists of running the adversary
with its oracles chosen according to some probability space. Probability Space 1 is that of the
experiment defining SuccA(Dbl, κ, n). Namely, the underlying experiment is:
F ← BC(κ, n) ; k∗1 ← {0, 1}
κ ; k∗2 ← {0, 1}
κ ; E ← Fk∗
1
◦ Fk∗
2
,
and Game 1 is to just run AE,F,F
−1
and reply to its oracle queries according to the functions
E,F, F−1 chosen by the experiment. Now, the experiment defining Probability Space 2 is
F ← BC(κ, n) ; k∗1 ← {0, 1}
κ ; k∗2 ← {0, 1}
κ ; E ← PERM(n) .
In Game 2, we just run AE,F,F
−1
and reply to its oracle queries according to the functions E,F, F−1
chosen by the experiment. Notice that in so doing, we completely ignore the two keys k∗1 , k
∗
2 ; the
responses to oracle queries do not depend on these at all. Thus, the output of A in Game 2 is
exactly that in the experiment defining SuccA(κ, n). The extra keys we have created will be used
only in the analysis. We let Pr1 [ · ] denote the probability under Probability Space 1, and Pr2 [ · ]
that under Probability Space 2.
Quantities involved. Since we are not limiting the computing power of the adversary, we may,
without loss of generality, regard it as deterministic. We may also assume it makes exactly q
E queries and exactly t F/F−1 queries, and that no query is ever repeated. When the oracles
E,F, F−1 are fixed, the sequence of queries by A and responses by the oracles is determined. We
view it as a game in which the adversary and the oracles alternate moves; one query followed by
a response is a round, so each round has two moves, the first by the adversary, the second by the
oracles. There are q + t rounds. We will be referring to the following quantities:
Mvs = The set { 0, 1, . . . , 2(q + t) } whose members will be used to index moves of
the game.
OdMvs = The set of odd numbers in Mvs, corresponding to question moves.
EvMvs = The set of even numbers in Mvs, corresponding to reply moves.
It is technically convenient to include 0 in these sets even though there is no 0-th round or move.
Furthermore we use the following notation:
qi : For i ∈ OdMvs, the query in the i-th move. It is of the form (x, ∗),
(k, x, ∗), or (k, ∗, y) which are queries to E, F , and F−1, respectively.
ri : For i ∈ EvMvs, the reply in the i-th move. For i > 0 it is (x,E(x)),
(k, x, Fk(x)), or (k, F
−1
k (y), y), corresponding, respectively, to the
query qi−1; for i = 0 it is the empty string.
Viewi(A
E,F,F−1) : For i ∈ Mvs, the view of the adversary after i moves; this is
q1r2 . . . qi−1ri if i > 0 is even; q1r1 . . . ri−1qi if i is odd; and the
empty string if i = 0
View(AE,F,F
−1
) : View2(q+t)(A
E,F,F−1).
Note the adversary’s output bit is some deterministic function of the last view. We call the keys
(k∗1 , k
∗
2) chosen in the games the crucial key pair. Our analysis will focus on whether or not this
key pair is “eliminated” by a current view, and what is its distribution from the point of view of A
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if not. So let vi represent a possible view after i moves of the game. We consider two sets of key
pairs, the “seen key pairs” (SKP) and the “remaining key pair” (RKP):
SKP(vi) : A key pair k1, k2 is in SKP(vi) if there are two queries q and q
′ in vi such
that q is an F -query or F−1 query with key k1 (i.e., a query of the form
(k1, x, ∗) or (k1, ∗, y), respectively), and q
′ is an F -query or F−1 query with
key k2 (i.e., a query of the form (k2, x, ∗) or (k2, ∗, y), respectively).
RKP(vi) = ({0, 1}
κ × {0, 1}κ)− SKP(vi)
Note that SKP(vi) depends only on the queries in vi and not on the replies. That is, SKP(vi) =
SKP(vi+1) for i ∈ OdMvs. If A knows that Fk2(x) = y and Fk1(y) = z and has also made the E
query x then it can with high probability eliminate (k1, k2) as a candidate for the crucial key pair.
Intuitively, we might think of the key pairs (k1, k2) ∈ SKP(v) as being “eliminated”. (Of course,
they might not be eliminated, but we can’t be sure, so we count them out.) Thus RKP(vi) captures
the set of remaining key pairs associated to any view. These are the key pairs (k1, k2) so that at
least one of them has not been in either an F or an F−1 query. Note the key pair is not considered
“eliminated” if one of its components has been in a F/F−1 query: both have to have been in such
queries to “eliminate” the pair.
The current view vi contains some number of F or F
−1 queries on a particular key k. This
effectively “opens up” the corresponding spots in row k of the F table, in the sense that in the
randomly chosen F table, these entries become known to the adversary. Similarly for E-queries.
We let
F-Qrs(vi, k) = The set of all y such that there are responses in vi of the form (k, x, y).
E-Qrs(vi) = The set of all y such that there are responses in vi of the form (x, y).
The random variables. Under the random choice of E,F, F−1 made in the probability spaces 1
and 2, the above discussed quantities become random variables. Here are some random variables
we will need to refer to explicitly:
Qi : Takes value qi, the i-th query, for i ∈ OdMvs.
Ri : Takes value ri, the i-th reply, for i ∈ EvMvs.
Ti : Equals Qi if i is odd and Ri if i is even.
Viewi : Takes value Viewi(A
E,F,F−1), for i ∈ Mvs.
View : Takes value View(AE,F,F
−1
).
Ui,j : Equals Ti . . .Tj
The bad event. We also define a central event:
badi : For i ∈ Mvs, event badi is said to happen if the crucial key pair (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) is
seen, that is, (k∗1, k
∗
2) ∈ SKP(Viewi).
In other words, the crucial key pair is “eliminated”. Whether a particular key pair has been seen
only depends on the queries of A and thus badi = badi+1 for i ∈ OdMvs. We let bad be bad2(q+t),
meaning it captures whether the bad event happened at the end of the game.
3.2 Proof outline
A very rough cut at the idea of the analysis is that as long as bad has not happened in probability
space 1, the answers coming back to oracle queries there “look random” and so probability space 1
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looks like probability space 2. We can then bound the advantage by the probability of the bad
event.
This is overly simplistic. It is also incorrect. One should first note that even if the bad event fails
to happen in game 1, that game will not look like game 2; there are events that have probability one
in the latter and zero in the former. In fact, we need to condition on the bad event not happening
in both probability spaces.
We will show that the conditional probability of a particular view given that bad has not
occurred is the same in the two games. To show this we will be forced to show something stronger
as stated in the lemma below.
Lemma 3.2 Let i ∈ Mvs and let vi be a possible view of the adversary after the i-th move. Then
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ 2(q + t)− i,
Pr1 [ Viewi = vi | badi+s ] = Pr2 [ Viewi = vi | badi+s ] .
The proof of this lemma is postponed until later. Since the final decision of the adversary depends
only on its view, the distribution of the adversary’s decision is the same in the two games as long
as the bad event has not happened. Thus, a corollary to the above lemma is
Pr1
[
AE,F,F
−1
= 1 | bad
]
= Pr2
[
AE,F,F
−1
= 1 | bad
]
. (1)
Less obvious is that Lemma 3.2 will also be needed to show that the probability of the bad event
is the same in both games. To show this we need to prove something a bit stronger: we need to
show that the equality holds at any stage. This is stated in the lemma stated below.
Lemma 3.3 For all i = 0, . . . , 2(q + t),
Pr1 [badi ] = Pr2 [badi ] . (2)
The proof of this lemma is also postponed until later. Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3 can be used to bound
the advantage of the adversary by the probability of the bad event.
Lemma 3.4 AdvA(Dbl, κ, n) ≤ Pr2 [bad ].
Proof of Lemma 3.4: The lemma is shown using the following straightforward calculation. We
suppress the superscripts of AE,F,F
−1
for clarity.
Pr1 [A = 1 ]− Pr2 [A = 1 ]
= Pr1 [ A = 1 | bad ] · Pr1 [bad ] − Pr2 [A = 1 | bad ] · Pr2 [bad ]
+ Pr1 [ A = 1 | bad ] · Pr1 [bad ] − Pr2 [A = 1 | bad ] · Pr2 [bad ]
= (Pr1 [A = 1 | bad ]− Pr2 [A = 1 | bad ]) · Pr2 [bad ])
+ (Pr1 [A = 1 | bad ]− Pr2 [A = 1 | bad ]) · Pr2 [bad ]
= (Pr1 [A = 1 | bad ]− Pr2 [A = 1 | bad ]) · Pr2 [bad ] .
The second equality follows by Lemma 3.3. The last equality follows by Equation (1).
Of course, since the probability of the bad event is the same in both probability spaces we could
have bounded the advantage by the probability of the bad event in probability space 1. However,
calculating the probability of the bad event is very easy in probability space 2 as can be seen below.
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Lemma 3.5 Pr2 [bad ] ≤ t
2/22κ.
Proof of Lemma 3.5: This is straightforward, since in Game 2, no information about the keys
(k∗1, k
∗
2) is given to the adversary. The bad event depends only on the number of F and F
−1 queries,
and in the worst case all the t such queries are made to different keys. Then the chance that k∗1 is
in any query is t/2κ, and the same, independently, for k∗2, so the bound holds.
Clearly, Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 imply Theorem 3.1. This completes the outline of the proof of
Theorem 3.1. To complete the proof we must prove Lemmas 3.2 and 3.3.
To do so we will first need a sequence of three lemmas, Lemmas 3.6, 3.7, and 3.8. The last of
these will be used in the proof of Lemma 3.2. Lemma 3.6 will again be used to prove Lemma 3.9 on
the conditional probability of the crucial key pair. Lemma 3.9 will then be used with Lemma 3.2
to prove Lemma 3.3.
3.3 Distribution of replies in the next round
In Game 2, given the view vi at any point, the distribution of the answer to the next oracle query
is, clearly, uniform, over the remaining range; for example, the answer to an E-query is uniform
over {0, 1}n − E-Qrs(vi).
The first lemma will say this is true for Game 1 too, as long as the bad event does not happen.
However, we will need to say this in a strong sense. Namely, fix any key pair that has still not been
“eliminated”. Conditioned on this being the crucial key pair, as well as on the current view, the
distribution of the answer to the next oracle query is still “as it should be,” meaning uniform over
whatever possibilities remain. Note we must show this for all types of queries: E,F and F−1.
Lemma 3.6 Let j ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ OdMvs. Let vi = q1r2 . . . qi−2ri−1qi be a possible view of the
adversary just before the answer to query qi is obtained. For any string ri+1 ∈ {0, 1}
n and all
(k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi‖ri+1),
Prj [ Ri+1 = ri+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ] =

1
2n − |E-Qrs(vi)|
if qi is an E-query and ri+1 6∈ E-Qrs(vi)
1
2n − |F-Qrs(k, vi)|
if qi is an F or F
−1 query with key k and ri+1 6∈ F-Qrs(k, vi)
0 otherwise.
In particular, the value depends neither on j nor on (k1, k2).
Proof of Lemma 3.6: This is clear for Game 2, ie. for j = 2. The proof is devoted to showing
it also for Game 1, ie. for j = 1.
Let vi+1 = viri+1. We fix a particular key pair (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi+1). Assume Viewi = vi, and
assume (k∗1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2). Note this implies that badi+1 holds. Now consider three cases.
Case 1: qi is an E-query.
We want to show that Ri+1 is equally likely to be any string not yet returned as an answer to an
E-query. The danger is that F or F−1 queries have been made to at least one of the crucial keys
k1, k2, and this is giving some information about Fk1 ◦ Fk2 in addition to that from the E queries.
However, this won’t happen. This can be seen as follows. We know that badi+1 holds, which means
either k1 or k2 has never been in any F or F
−1 query of the adversary. This means that Fk1 ◦ Fk2 ,
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being the composition of two permutations with one random, is random from the point of view of
the adversary. (The probability here is over the choice of the cipher F , which assigns a random
permutation to each key.) Of course the adversary has partial information about Fk1 ◦ Fk2 in the
form of replies to previous E-queries, but this gives no information on the value of any remaining
one except that it will not be one already seen.
Case 2: qi is an F -query.
Let k be the key in the query. If k 6∈ {k1, k2} it is clear that the response to the query is randomly
distributed over {0, 1}n−F-Qrs(k, vi) just by the random choice of F in the experiment. So suppose
k = kl where l ∈ {1, 2}. Now, the danger is that E queries yielded some information about Fk
in addition to the queries made directly to key Fk, so the adversary will have some advantage in
predicting a new value on Fk.
However, this will not be true. This can be seen as follows. We know (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi+1), which
means that either k1 or k2 has not been in any F or F
−1 query up to and including the query in qi.
Let π = Fk1 ◦ Fk2 . As the composition of two permutations, one of which is random, it is random
from the point of view of the adversary. Then Fk = Fkl = π ◦ F
−1
k2
if l = 1 and Fk = Fkl = F
−1
k1
◦ π
if l = 2. In either case, Fk is the composition of two permutations, one of which is random from
the point of view of the adversary, and hence the response to an F query on key k will return a
value distributed uniformly over {0, 1}n − F-Qrs(k, vi).
Case 3: qi is an F
−1-query.
The proof that the response to the query is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}n − F-Qrs(k, vi) is
similar to the case above.
The above lemma shows that for a fixed partial conversation vi where i ∈ OdMvs, and fixed pair
of keys k1, k2 such that badi is true (i.e., (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi)), all the answers ri+1 which continue
to keep the partial conversations from being “bad” (i.e., (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(viri+1)), have the same
probability in each probability space. We will use this lemma to prove an extension of this. Namely,
for a fixed partial conversation vi and fixed pair of keys k1, k2 such that badi is true, all further
move sequences which continue to keep the partial conversations from being “bad” have the same
probability in each probability space. We state this formally below.
Lemma 3.7 Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Let vi be a possible view of the adversary after move i ∈ Mvs, and
let 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ 2(q + t)− i. For any possible extension ui+1,i+ℓ of vi by ℓ moves, and for any key pair
(k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi‖ui+1,i+ℓ),
Prj [ Ui+1,i+ℓ = ui+1,i+ℓ | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ]
depends neither on j nor on (k1, k2). (That is, it depends only on vi and ui+1,i+ℓ.)
Proof of Lemma 3.7: We will prove this by induction on ℓ. The base case is ℓ = 1. In this case
the lemma is clear when i + 1 = i + ℓ is odd, because in this case ui+1,i+1 is a query, which is a
function only of A and vi. In the case of i+1 = i+ ℓ being even, ui+1,i+1 is the response Ri+1, and
we can apply Lemma 3.6.
Now assume that the lemma is true for ℓ = s. We want to establish it for ℓ = s+ 1. Again, this is
trivial if i+s+1 is odd, because then the extension is a query, uniquely determined given viui+1,i+s
and A. So assume i + s + 1 is even. Let ui+1,i+s+1 = ui+1,i+sri+s+1 and vi+s = viui+1,i+s. We
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assume that (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(viui+1,i+s+1). We can write
Prj [ Ui+1,i+s+1 = ui+1,i+s+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ] =
Prj [ Ri+s+1 = ri+s+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi+s = vi+s ]
·Prj [ Ui+1,i+s = ui+1,i+s | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ] .
The first factor depends neither on j nor on (k1, k2) by Lemma 3.6. The second factor has the same
property by induction.
We now use the above lemma to prove a generalization of Lemma 3.6 which we will need subse-
quently.
Lemma 3.8 Let j ∈ {1, 2} and i ∈ OdMvs. Let vi = q1r2 . . . qi−2ri−1qi be a possible view of
the adversary just before the answer to query qi is obtained. For any string ri+1 ∈ {0, 1}
n, all
(k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi‖ri+1), and all 0 ≤ s ≤ 2(q + t)− i,
Prj [ Ri+1 = ri+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ∧ badi+s ]
depends neither on j nor on k1, k2. (That is, it depends only on vi and ri+1 and s.)
Proof of Lemma 3.8: First suppose s = 0. The conditioning on badi is redundant; this event
will be true because (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi‖ri+1). Thus the claim is true from Lemma 3.6.
So assume s ≥ 1. The probability in the statement of the lemma can be written as
Prj [ Ri+1 = ri+1 ∧ badi+s | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ]
Prj [ badi+s | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ]
.
The denominator can be written as
∑
Prj [ Ui+1,i+s = ui+1,i+s | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ]
where the sum is over ui+1,i+s such that (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(viui+1,i+s). By Lemma 3.7 each term of
this sum has a value that depends neither on j nor on (k1, k2). The numerator can be written as∑
Prj [ Ri+1Ui+2,i+s = ri+1ui+2,i+s | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ]
where the sum is over ui+2,i+s such that (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(viri+1ui+2,i+s). By Lemma 3.7 each term
of this sum depends neither on j nor on (k1, k2). This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: The proof will be by induction on i ∈ Mvs. The base case of the induction
is when i = 0, and in this case the lemma is trivially true because the view is by definition the
empty string. So assume the statement of the lemma up to move i. We will prove it for i+ 1. Fix
an arbitrary s ≥ 0.
First consider the case where i ∈ EvMvs, meaning the last move in vi is a reply. Let qi+1 be
arbitrary. Then:
Prj [ Viewi+1 = viqi+1 | badi+1+s ]
= Prj [ Viewi = vi | badi+1+s ] · Prj [ Qi+1 = qi+1 | Viewi = vi ∧ badi+1+s ] .
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First, look at the first factor. Since s ≥ 0 by assumption, then s + 1 ≥ 0, and therefore the first
term is the same for j = 1 and 2 by induction. Next look at the second factor. A’s query is just
dependent on A and on vi, the view so far. Thus, the probability is the same for both j = 1 and
j = 2. (And is equal to 0 except possibly for one value of qi+1.) Therefore, the product of the two
probabilities is equal for j = 1 and j = 2, for all s ≥ 0.
Next consider the case where i ∈ OdMvs, meaning the last move in vi is a query. Let ri+1 ∈ {0, 1}
n
be arbitrary and let vi+1 = viri+1. Then:
Prj [ Viewi+1 = viri+1 | badi+1+s ]
= Prj [ Viewi = vi | badi+1+s ] · Prj [ Ri+1 = ri+1 | Viewi = vi ∧ badi+1+s ] .
Consider the first factor. Since s ≥ 0 by assumption, then s + 1 ≥ 0, and therefore, by induction,
the first term is the same for j = 1 and 2. The second factor is equal to:
∑
(k1,k2)
pj(k1, k2) · qj(k1, k2)
where the sum is over all (k1, k2) ∈ {0, 1}
κ × {0, 1}κ and we have set
pj(k1, k2) = Prj [ Ri+1 = ri+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ∧ Viewi = vi ∧ badi+1+s ]
qj(k1, k2) = Prj [ (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) | Viewi = vi ∧ badi+1+s ]
We start by examining the first factor, namely pj(k1, k2). By Lemma 3.8, for all (k1, k2) /∈
SKP(vi+1), this probability is the same for both j = 1 and 2, and independent of (k1, k2). Call
this value p. On the other hand for (k1, k2) ∈ SKP(vi+1) we have pj(k1, k2) = 0 because of the
conditioning on badi+1+s. Thus the above sum reduces to
p ·
∑
(k1,k2)
qj(k1, k2)
where the sum is over all (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi+1). We claim that this range is over all the nonzero
values of the probability and thus the sum is equal to 1. To see this, note that qj(k1, k2) is equal
to 0 for (k1, k2) ∈ SKP(vi+1). This completes the induction and the proof of Lemma 3.2.
The remaining task is to prove Lemma 3.3 which states that the probability that the bad event
occurs is the same in both probability spaces. To do so we will first prove the following lemma
about the distribution of keys. The proof of this lemma will use Lemma 3.2 which, recall, states
that the probability of a given query and response (which are not bad) for a fixed partial view and
a fixed pair of keys (which are not bad) is the same in both probability spaces.
3.4 Equi-probability of unseen keys
A crucial lemma is that in Game 1, as long as the bad event has not happened, if adversary has
a particular view, then any “un-eliminated” key pair is equally likely to be the crucial key pair.
Without this, it might be that the adversary’s chance of hitting the crucial key is better in Game 1
(given the bad event fails) than in Game 2 (given the bad event fails). To simplify notation, for
j ∈ {1, 2} and vi let
Prj,vi [ · ] = Prj [ · | Viewi = vi ∧ badi ] .
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Lemma 3.9 Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Let vi be a possible view of the adversary after move i ∈ Mvs. Let
(k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi). Then
Prj,vi [ (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] =
1
|RKP(vi)|
.
Proof of Lemma 3.9: This is clear in Game 2, ie. for j = 2. The proof is devoted to showing
the claim in Game 1, ie. for j = 1. The proof will be by induction on the move number i ∈ Mvs.
The base case is i = 0. In this case no queries have been made so the adversary has no information
about (k∗1, k
∗
2), and all possible pairs of keys remain equally likely, so the claim is true. So, assume
the lemma statement is true up to move i ∈ Mvs where i < 2(q + t). We will prove it for i+ 1.
Let vi+1 = viτ where τ = qi+1 is a query if i is even and τ = ri+1 is a reply if i is odd. Assume
(k1, k2) is some key pair. Consider the quantity
Pr1,vi+1 [ (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] . (3)
Claim 1: The quantity of Equation (3) is zero if (k1, k2) 6∈ RKP(vi+1).
Proof of Claim 1: This is because Pr1,vi+1 [ · ] conditions on badi+1, meaning we know badi+1 did
not happen. ✷
Claim 2: Let (k1, k2) be any key pair in RKP(vi+1). Then the quantity of Equation (3) has a value
that depends only on vi+1, and not on (k1, k2).
We will prove Claim 2 below. The two claims together imply that the only possibility is that for
all (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi+1),
Pr1,vi+1 [ (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] =
1
|RKP(vi+1)|
.
Thus the induction would be completed.
Proof of Claim 2: Recall Ti+1 = Qi+1 if i is even and Ti+1 = Ri+1 if i is odd. Expand the quantity
of Equation (3):
Pr1,vi+1 [ (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] = Pr1,vi [ (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) | Ti+1 = τ ∧ badi+1 ]
and then apply Bayes rule to get:
Pr1,vi [ Ti+1 = τ ∧ badi+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] ·
Pr1,vi [ (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ]
Pr1,vi [Ti+1 = τ ∧ badi+1 ]
.
We want to argue this quantity does not depend on (k1, k2). Look first at the fraction. The value of
the numerator is given by the induction hypothesis and in particular does not depend on (k1, k2).
The value of the denominator obviously does not depend on (k1, k2) since that quantity appears
nowhere in it. Thus, what is left is to show that
Pr1,vi [ Ti+1 = τ ∧ badi+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] (4)
does not depend on (k1, k2).
Observe that the conjunction of the event badi+1 in the probability of Equation (4) is redundant:
since we are conditioning on (k∗1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2), and we know that (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi+1), the
conditioning already tells us that badi+1 will hold. In other words,
Pr1,vi [ Ti+1 = τ ∧ badi+1 | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] = Pr1,vi [ Ti+1 = τ | (k
∗
1, k
∗
2) = (k1, k2) ] .
Now we consider separately the case where i + 1 is odd (meaning Ti+1 = Qi+1 and τ = qi+1) and
the case where i + 1 is even (meaning Ti+1 = Ri+1 and τ = ri+1). In the first case, note that
the query made is determined only by (A and) the view vi, so the probability in question does
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not depend on (k1, k2). In the second case, we can apply Lemma 3.6 which gives the value of the
above quantity for each (k1, k2) ∈ RKP(vi+1), and, as we see from Lemma 3.6, that value does not
depend on (k1, k2). This completes the proof of Claim 2. ✷
Using the above lemma we can now prove Lemma 3.3 which (recall) states that Pr1[badi ] =
Pr2[badi ] for all i ∈ Mvs.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: The proof is by induction on i ∈ Mvs. The base case is when i = 0. In
this case, the current view v of the adversary, in either game, is empty, so that SKP(v) = ∅. Thus,
both probabilities are zero.
So, assume the lemma statement is true up to move i ∈ Mvs where i < 2(q + t). We will prove it
for i+ 1, namely we will show that
Pr1 [badi+1 ] = Pr2 [badi+1 ] . (5)
We first consider the case where i+ 1 is even, meaning the last move in vi is a query. We have
Prj [badi+i ] = Prj [badi ] + Prj [ badi+1 | badi ] .
The first term is equal for j = 1 and 2 by induction, and Prj [ badi+1 | badi ] = 0 because i+1 is
even.
To complete the induction we need to prove Equation (5) for the case where i+ 1 is odd, meaning
the last move in vi is a reply. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. We can write
Prj [badi+1 ] = Prj [badi ] + Prj [ badi+1 | badi ] .
The first term is independent of j by the induction hypothesis. We will now argue that the second
term is also independent of j. By conditioning we can write the second term as
Prj [ badi+1 | badi ] =
∑
vi∈Vj
Prj [ badi+1 | badi ∧ Viewi = vi ] · Prj [ Viewi = vi | badi ]
=
∑
vi∈Vj
Prj,vi [badi+1 ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
first term
·Prj [ Viewi = vi | badi ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
second term︸ ︷︷ ︸
product term associated to vi
,
where Vj = { vi : Prj [ Viewi = vi | badi ] > 0} is the set of possible views after move i in Game j.
Let us first observe that V1 = V2, namely the set of views vi for which the second term of the
“product term associated to vi” is positive is the same in both games. This is true by Lemma 3.2,
which tells us that Prj [ Viewi = vi | badi ] does not depend on j and hence in particular the values
of v for which it is zero are the same for j = 1 and j = 2.
Now let us set V = V1 = V2 and compare the sums, term by term, in the cases j = 1 and j = 2.
Fix a particular string vi ∈ V and focus on the “product term associated to vi.” The second term
in it is independent of j by Lemma 3.2. We will show the same is true for the first term, which
will complete the proof. (One needs to be a little careful. The first term is not well defined for just
any v, only for vi ∈ Vj . That’s why it was important, first, to restrict attention to these vi values,
and, second, to make sure that V1 = V2, since otherwise we would not be sure that we have shown
equality for every term in the two sums.)
So the remaining task is to consider Prj [ badi+1 | badi ∧ Viewi = vi ] for vi ∈ V and show
it does not depend on j. First note that RKP(vi) 6= ∅, because, RKP(vi) = ∅ would imply
Prj [ Viewi = vi | badi ] = 0, and we have assumed the last to not be true.
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Since the view vi and the adversary are fixed, the next query qi+1 is uniquely determined. Let
NKP(vi, qi+1) = RKP(vi)−RKP(vi‖qi+1)
be the set of “new key pairs” that are “seen” by the (i + 1)-th query. (This set is empty if the
latter is an E-query. It is also empty if it is an F or F−1 query with key with which A has already
queried. If it is an F or F−1 query with key k with which A has not queried, then the set consists
of pairs (k, k′) and (k′, k) where k′ is any other key with which A has queried F or F−1.) We claim
that
Prj [ badi+1 | badi ∧ Viewi = vi ] =
|NKP(vi, qi+1)|
|RKP(vi)|
, (6)
for both j = 1 and j = 2. Note the fraction is well defined, in that the denominator is not zero,
because RKP(vi) is non-empty.
Equation (6) follows from Lemma 3.9. This tells us that from the point of view of the adversary,
all remaining key pairs remain equally likely, in either game.
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A Best attack: Meet in the middle
In this section we will show the following:
Lemma A.1 For any κ, n ≥ 1, any 1 ≤ s ≤ q ≤ 2n−1, and any t ≥ 2s, there is an adversary A
such that
AdvA(Dbl, κ, n) ≥
t2
4s2
·
(
1
22κ
−
1
2s(n−1)
)
.
We can now optimize the value of s and obtain the following theorem which says that the bound
of Theorem 3.1 is essentially tight:
Theorem A.2 For any κ, n ≥ 1, let s = ⌈(2κ+1)/(n− 1)⌉. Then for any t ≥ 2s and s ≤ q ≤ 2n−1
it is the case that
Sec(Dbl, κ, n, q, t) ≥
1
8s2
t2
22κ
.
Proof: The choice of s guarantees that 22κ+1 ≤ 2s(n−1). This means that
1
22κ
−
1
2s(n−1)
≥
1
2
1
22κ
.
Now apply Lemma A.1.
Notice that for typical block cipher parameters κ, n, the value of s is very small. For example, for
the DES parameters κ = 56 and n = 64 we have s = ⌈113/63⌉ = 2. Thus the above lower bound
of Theorem A.2 is in practice close to the upper bound of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Lemma A.1: The proof is by presenting an adversary A who achieves the claimed
advantage. The adversary A plays a version of the meet-in-the-middle attack, but we need to
adapt it slightly and then analyze it in our framework. It is convenient to let [N ] = {1, 2, . . . , N}
for any integer N ≥ 1. The adversary proceeds as follows:
For j = 1, . . . , s do
Let xj ∈ {0, 1}
n be the j-th string in lexicographic order
Compute yj = E(xj)
Endfor
Choose two disjoint sets K1 = { k1,i : i ∈ [t/2s] } and K2 = { k2,i : i ∈ [t/2s] } of κ-bit keys,
each set being of size t/2s. (These might be chosen at random, but not necessarily).
For i = 1, . . . , t/2s do
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For j = 1, . . . , s do Compute ui,j = F (k1,i, xj) and vi,j = F
−1(k2,i, yj) Endfor
Let ui = (ui,1, . . . , ui,s) and vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,s)
Endfor
Let C = { (a, b) ∈ [t/2s]× [t/2s] : ua = vb }
If C 6= ∅ then return 1 else return 0
We now analyze this attack. The first claim is that the cost is as claimed, meaning A makes at
most q E-queries and at most t F/F−1 queries. The first is true because s ≤ q by assumption.
The second is true because the number of calls to F/F−1 above is 2[(t/2s)s] = t. We now want to
lower bound
AdvA(Dbl, κ, n) = SuccA(Dbl, κ, n)− SuccA(κ, n) .
We will lower bound the first term and upper bound the second. Let Pr[ · ] denote the probability
in the experiment underlying the definition of SuccA(Dbl, κ, n), and let k
∗
1k
∗
2 denote the randomly
chosen 2κ bit key in this experiment. Observe that if k∗1 ∈ K1 and k
∗
2 ∈ K2 then C is definitely
non-empty. So
SuccA(Dbl, κ, n) ≥ Pr[ k
∗
1 ∈ K1 and k
∗
2 ∈ K2 ] =
(
t/2s
2κ
)2
=
1
4s2
t2
22κ
.
Now let Pr[ · ] denote the probability in the experiment underlying the definition of SuccA(κ, n),
and observe that
SuccA(κ, n) = Pr[C 6= ∅ ] .
For a fixed a, b ∈ [t/2s] we have
Pr[ua = vb ] =
s∏
j=1
1
N − j − 1
≤
(
1
2n−1
)s
.
The last inequality here is by the assumption that s ≤ 2n−1. By the union bound we have
Pr[C 6= ∅ ] ≤
t2
4s2
·
1
2s(n−1)
.
This completes the proof.
B Analysis of the two-key triple cipher
The two-key triple cipher (namely, the construction underlying two-key triple DES) was defined in
Section 2. The same upper bound on the advantage of any adversary A attacking this cipher can
be shown as for the double cipher:
Theorem B.1 For any κ, n, q, t ≥ 1 it is the case that
Sec(Trp2, κ, n, q, t) ≤
t2
22κ
.
Unlike the case of the double cipher, however, this bound is not tight, and we believe it can be
improved by a better analysis.
The proof of the theorem is obtained by adapting the proof of Theorem 3.1. We will use
essentially the same setup; we start by giving some new definitions and then continue by showing
the necessary modifications for the proof in Section 3 so that it works also in the case of operator
Trp2. large
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Games, setup, random variables and event badi. The experiment underlying Game 2 is the
same as for the proof of Theorem 3.1. The experiment underlying Game 1 is now the following:
F ← BC(κ, n) ; k∗1 ← {0, 1}
κ ; k∗2 ← {0, 1}
κ ; E ← Fk∗
1
◦ F−1k∗
2
◦ Fk∗
1
,
and the game is to just run AE,F,F
−1
and reply to its oracle queries according to the functions
E,F, F−1 chosen by the experiment. The setup and the random variables are defined exactly in
the same way as before, with the understanding that when we mention E-queries, in Game 1, we
refer to a query to the cipher Fk∗
1
◦ F−1k∗
2
◦ Fk∗
1
. Event badi is formally defined exactly as before.
Analysis. We observe that almost all lemmas in our previous analysis do not significantly depend
on the construction we are analyzing. More precisely, we see that all lemmas but Lemma 3.6 require
no modification for both the statement and the proof to hold also in the case of the construction
Trp2. So it remains to modify Lemma 3.6 so that it works also in the current case. Recall that such
lemma is trying to show that the distribution of the next reply is independent of which game the
adversary is in, and also of a fixed un-eliminated key pair. However, this can in fact be seen to still
be true, because we are still looking at compositions of random permutations with one unknown.
We omit the details.
Lower bound. The standard meet in the middle attack for triple DES [5, 12] can be put and
analyzed in our model analogously to the way we did it above for the double cipher. The analysis
indicates that our upper bound for the two-key triple cipher is tight (up to a constant factor) when
q ≈ t, but not tight in general. We do not include the details of this analysis.
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